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John Locke in his Second Treatise ~ Civil Government quoted extensively 
from Richard Hooker's la!!!!! Ef Ecclesiastical Polity. It has often been taken 
for granted that Hooker was a precursor of the political theories of the ori-
gen of government, the consent of the governed, and sovereignty as developed 
and perfected b,y Locke. The historical and philosophical problem to be con-
sidered in this thesis is the relationship or Hooker to Locke: the purpose 
or ·the two works, the particular development or ideas in each, the concepts 
borrowed or shared, and the historical realities and philosophical outlooks 
which contribute to their distinctive worth. 
The major contribution or John Locke to political thought is the Second 
Treatise .2! Government, !!!. Essay; Concerning~~ Original,· Extent, .!!!!!. 
End of Civil Government, wherein he develops his theories of tbe natural 
--
rights or man, the contractual basis or political society, private property' 
and the dissolution of government. After restating and concluding the basic 
arguments or the First Treatise, a refutation of divine right monarchy as 
presented in Robert Filroer's Patriarcha, Locke introduces his major work 
with a definition of political power. 
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with 
Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the 
Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force 
of the Community, in the Execution of such laws, and in the de-
fence of the Common-wialth from Foreign Injury, and all this only 
for the Pub lick Good. 
The remainder of Locke's discourse is devoted to a full explication of the 
origin, nature, and extent of this power, so defined. 
It is significant tha'f;, .Locke focused upon the State of Nature as the 
2 
springboard for his treatise, for the natural characteristics or man become 
the foundation of his political doctrine. Man in the natural state is both 
free and equal. His freedom allows him to act as he wishes without depend-
ence upon or subjection to any other man. Equality refers to the condition 
that all men have access to the same advantages of nature without subordina-
2 
tion to any other person. Lest this "State of Liber;y-11 among free and equal 
men be distorted to condone a "State of Licenf;le, 11 Locke reminds us of a law 
which governs the State of Nature. Natural law he equates with reason which 
offers no justification' for destroying the "Life, Health, Liberty or Posses-
sions" or either a fellow human being or oneself. After all, Locke inquires, 
who are we but "the Workmanship or one Omnipotent and Infinitely wise Maker; 
All the Servants of one Sovereign Master ••• n3 Human freedom and equality, 
therefore, even in the State of Nature, are not absolute; man is never free 
of God's superiority nor equal to God. 4 
If the State of Nature is governed by Natural Law, some authority neces-
sarily must be invested with the power to execute the law, or else it would 
exist in vain. Locke proposes the "Strange Doctrine" that every man in his 
natural state has the right to punish a transgressor or the la.w. Punishment 
is defined as the only lawful means whereby one man comes to power over an-
other for the purpose of doing him harm, and what one man is allowed to do 
in the prosecution of the law, everyone bas the right to do.5 The power to 
punish is not arbitrary but dictated by reason and restricted to two purposes 
derived from the natural rights of man. Any person may punish a crime for 
restraint by his right to preserve and protect all mankind. The right of 
self-protection also allows an injured party to exact punishment in the form 
of reparation. 
3 
The peace and preservation of a state where every man possesses the 
executive power of the law and whe~e each man is· his own judge is obviously 
dependent upon the degree to which each member exercises his responsibility 
judiciously. Locke realizes, however, that human weaknesses preclude justice 
in the State of Nature. Selfishness, partiality, violence, passion, and re-
. venge on the part of those in power will lead to confusion and a breach of 
peace. In light of the reality of human nature, Locke proposes that "the 
proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature n is civil govern-
6 
ment. Yet the formation of government in fulfillment of Locke 1s prescrip-
tion is conditioned by an underlying prerequisite. All men will remain in 
their natural state and continue to suffer its injustices "till by their own 
Consents they make themselves members of some Politick Society.n7 
This statement marks the first appearance of the concept of contract 
government or authority based upon the consent of the governed. Consent, 
whether tacit or expre~sed, implies choice and approval by those involved. 
Locke supplies the motivation for such a willful decision by a description 
of the State of War which is a potential, if not prevailing, condition of 
man • s natural environment. The State of War is generally characterized by 
enmity, violence, and destruction in opposition to the good will, peace, and 
8 
preservation which exemplify the State of Nature. Locke equates war with 
slavery, a violation of man's natural freedom • 
••• so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts him-
self into a State of War with me. He that in the State of Nature, 
would take away the Freedom, that belongs to any one in that State, 
must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every9 
thing else, that Freedom being the Foundation of all the rest ••• 
The one great reason why men choose to quit the State of Nature and commit 
themselves to a civil society is, according to Locke, to avoid this State of 
war. Government serves to exclude war among individuals by creating an 
4 
10 
eart~ authority to which an appeal for relief and justice can be made. 
What then is the advantage of surrender to civU authority? Granted, 
government bas the power to protect human freedom a.R:ainst the enslavement 
of war, but this remedy must be weighed against any forfeiture of man's lib-
erty in the natural state where he is subject to no human authority, but to 
the law of Nature. It is significant and somewhat paradoxical that Locke 
finds the preservation of- liberty embodied in law. Liberty for the man who 
. . . 
has entered.into political society is the privilege of obedience only to 
common laws created by the legislature which was established with his consent. 
He is free under the law and guaranteed an appeal to civil authority it his 
freedom is violated. The law serves not to limit but to direct free and :in-
telligent agents; it is a preserver and enlarger rather than a restraint 
11 
upon the bounds ot freedom. 
Once again, as in the State of Nature, this freedom is qualified by 
reason and responsibility. One operates within the jurisdiction of the law 
only after he has attained to a certain measure of reasonableness. Locke's 
point here is illustrated by the maturation process of a child. Children are 
born to but not in the State of Equality. A child remains dependent upon 
parental will until such time that he acquires the degree of understanding 
which made his father free. Upon reaching this age of reason, the bonds of 
the parents over their offspring are loosened, and the emerging adult becomes 
free, not to do whatever he please, but to dispose as he desire; or his person, 
12 
actions, and possessions within the law. 
Locke •s discussion of private property in Chapter Five of the Second 
Treatise is obviously an integral part of his polemic against Robert Filmer 
but also serves to establish this concept as the key to a definition of the 
5 
public good, in which interest all political power must be exercised. FilJner 
had raised, the problem that the original communism ordained by C~ through 
Adam could not evolve into a system of private possession of land or goods 
. 13 
without the universal consent of all mankind. It h'S.S Locke 1 s aim to reveal 
how men came to have property from part or that given them equally by God in 
the beginning without the express compact or society.. He begins with an af-
firmation or truth that the earth was appropriated to mankind in common along 
with the facility of reason necessary to take advantage of the fruits of na-
ture. Man is naturally endowed with the property or his person and, there-
fore, has a right to the results of' the labor of his body and the work of his 
hands. What is bestowed in common is useless, Locke reasons, until man's 
labor removes it from common and assigns t.o it a practical value. Imbedded 
in this idea of private property is the labor theory of value. As the source 
or the right of property, "tis labor indeed that puts the difference of value 
14 
on every thing." 
In refutation of those who might seek to identify Locke as the great 
defender of unlimited accumulation of private property, it is important to 
note his emphasis on the doctrine that there is no right witho_ut use. The 
Law of Nature which grants man prope~y also restricts its possession to the 
extent that man is capable of utilization. "As much as any one can make use 
of to any advantage of lite before it spoils; so much he may by his labour 
fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and 
15 
belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy." 
The vague and theoretical notions of the natural rights of tree and 
equal men in the State of Nature and the power to punish breaches of Natu-
ral Law, which both serve as basic elements in Locke's idea or the origin of 
6 
civil government, assume a distinct meaning in relationship to the more 
concrete concept of private property. To preserve the right to property, 
which in its broadest sense includes person, actions, and possessions, and 
the equally important right to punish anyone who infringes upon your prop-
erty become for Locke both the extent and pursuit of civil government. "The 
great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Com.'Uonwealths, and put-
ting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To 
which in the State of Nature there are many things wanting. nl6 
It follows from an understanding of the principle of trust by the mem-
bers of society in the agents of political authority for the purpose of pre-
serving property, that any form of ab!olute government is unacceptable. An 
absolute monarchy, for example, is inconsistent with the very definition of 
civil government. It grants to one person the po-..,er to invade the property 
of another man without hie consent and without means for appeal. It permits 
the monarch to retain the liberty and power of the State of Nature while all 
other men are subject to the restraint of the law and of his personal will, 
however arbitrar,r.17 
Locke defines the independent community which comes into existence when 
a number of men leave the State of Nature and join together in the bonds of 
civil soeiet:r by the term "commonwealth!!~ Government within a commonwealth 
is grounded in adherence to the principle of roa.jority rule. Individuals 
who consent to establish a community create one body politic. "· •• it being 
necessary to that which is one body to move one \'fay; it is necessary the 
Body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the 
18 
consent of the majority." Without accepting this application to political 
theory of a simple law of physics, Locke maintains that it would be impossible 
7 
for the government to exert any power whatsoever in fulfillment of the pur-
poses for which it was established. 
The acceptable forms of a commonwealth recognized by Locke are a demo-
cracy, an oligarchy, and an elective· or hereditary monarchy depending upon 
the concentration of power in the bands or the majority, a few men, or one 
19 
m~n respectively. The organization and separation of powers within any 
commonwealth is designed to compensate for certain voids in the State of Na-
ture. First, the legislature satisfies the demand for an established, known 
law to which the citizens consent and thereby provides a standard measure for 
solving all controversies that might arise among them. Secondly, the judi-
cial system creates an indifferent judge with authority to settle differences 
according to the positive law. Lastly, the need for a power to support and 
carry out the law and the sentences of the judges is fulfilled by the ~xecu-
20 
tive. A man aurranders his personal power of P\mishment in order to assist 
the executive authority in enforcing the laws instituted indirectly by his 
21 
own consent. 
There is no doubt in Loc~ s mind that the Sl'preme· authority or the 
commonwealth must be the legislature, for it is the instrument of the people 
in establishing the laws necessary for the preservation of society. Yet in 
the final analysis, Locke concludes that ultimate sovereignty resides in the 
community which retains the power to dissolve the legislature when it violates 
the confidence reposed in it. 
For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being lim-
ited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or op-
posed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve 
into the hands of those that gave it, who ma.y place it anew where 
they shall think best for their sa:f'ety and security. And thus the 
commonwealth perpetually retains a Supresm Power of saving themselves22 from the attempts and designs of any Body, even of their Legislators. 
8 
Resistance to tyranny is not condoned for individual members of society. The 
authority which individuals surrendered to government can never revert back 
to them while society lasts, but will continue to reside in the community. 
The society as one body never forfeits the original right to preserve itself. 
In such cases of the dissolution of government, the peop;I.e have tho liberty 
to provide for themselves by instituting a new legislature.23 
The acceptance of Locke's political axioms in the Second Treatise ~ 
Civil Government among his contemporaries was advanced by quotations from 
Richard Hooker's.!!!!, .2! Ecclesiastical Polity. There are approximately ten 
specific references to Hooker employed by Locke in support of the following 
views: that human law must agree with natural law; that the foundations of 
public society are man 1 s natural inclination to order and his agreement to 
form a government; that all laws are enacted by consent because the power to 
make them belongs to society; that no citizen is exempt from the law of soci-
ety; and that the ruler must be bound by the law. All of these principles are 
expounded by Hooker in one chapter or the first Book which seeks to define the 
several kinds of law in general and deals with the problems of the origin of 
political society and the nature of political obligation. An examination and 
review of the essential ideas set forth in Book I will hopefully provide a 
basis for comparing the political theOries of the origin, constitution and 
dissolution of the state in both Hooker and Locke. 
In the Preface to the~£! Ecclesiastical Polity, addressed "to them 
that seek {as they term it) the Reformation of the Laws and Orders Ecclesias-
tical in the Church of England, 11 Hooker quotes Gregory Naziazen in asserting 
that "God is not a God of sedition and confusion, but of order and peace. n24 
A peace.;;;loving God, Hooker reasons, wills that controversy should cease among 
9 
His people; He becomes the Author of a definite judgment to end strife. 
Hooker thus aims to minimize dissent within the Church of England by de-
tending the reasonableness of the status guo within the universal order 
preordained by the Creator. 
The fundamental assumption of Hooker in Book I is that all thing work 
25 
according to law. Even God, the Supreme Being, operates under an eternal, 
immutable· law set down by Him in the beginning to do all things by. Reflec-
tions of God • s law are classified according to the different agents which are 
subject to it and the conditions under which it is revealed. Heavenly or 
Celestial Law is that order which angels observe, and is clearly known and 
understood by them. The part of Eternal law which guides human agents is 
t.ermed Natural law. The Law of Nature is the instrument of the Divine for 
maintaining the world. The means through which man comes to ascertain Na-
tural law is reason. All human creatures are bound by the law of Reason or 
which one is able to perceive rationally" Finally, Divine law also binds 
man and is made known to him onls through revelation. 26 
In determining the end and course or human action, Hooker postulates 
that man aspires to conformity with God. Basic impulses such as reproduction 
represent man • s desire to imitate an eternal God. by the . continuance of his 
own being. The quest for perfection is realized in the pursuit of knowledge 
and the exercise or virtue. 27 In search of truth, man is distinguished from 
angels. He has no initial understanding, but begins as a blank book to be 
written as he grows into sensib~e knowledge and also attains a higher under-
standing or that beyond the senses. This is the tabula .!:.!.!!! idea later de-
veloped systematically in Locke's Essay Concerninr. Human Understanding. The 
exercise of virtue is closely related to the concept of man 1 s will. To will 
10 
is to incline toward what seems good. It is differentiated from appetite in 
that the object of will is not only desired but reasonable and possible. UTo 
will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which seems good. 
Goodness is seen with the eye of tr..&understanding. And the light of that eye, 
is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, know..o 
28 
ledge and will." 
Reason, then, is the crucial factor influencing man's activity; it is 
the bounds of will and the means of attaining knowledge. Hooker offers three 
characteristics of the Law of Reason, whereby it may be comprehended. First, 
those who follow the law of Reason resemble ;most closely the works of nature; 
they are be~uti!'ul and without defect. Secondly, the law of Reason can be 
investigated without the aid of divine re.vel.a.tion, simply by employing reason. 
Last:Qr, the knowledge of these laws is general. Men have always been acquaint-
29 
ed with the Law of Reason and have never rejected it as irrational or unjust. 
Hooker now explores the question of how reason leads mankind into forming 
fellowships and agreeing to make the human laws necessary to govern political 
societies. A man naturally enters into society because he is socially inclined, 
because practically he can obtain the necessities of life more easily by work-
ing with others, and because,a civil au~hority can relieve mutual grievances 
existing in the State of Nature. Men consent to human laws b~cause they real-
ize the need to maintain peace and order and because reason tells them that 
government cannot fulfill this function without laws. Political power, unlike 
that of a father within the structure of family relationships, is not natural 
and, therefore, must either be granted or usurped. Since only one of these 
means is justifiable, it is evident that peace, tranquility, and happiness 
are be6t procured by consent of those to be governed. The people's assent 
11 
may be through representative bodies, such as Parliament, whose decisions 
are as binding as if' the individual citizens were present.. Although the 
people's assent is not always apparent, all positive laws ordained for the 
external order rest upon public approval. "Laws therefore human, of what 
kind soever, are available by consent. ~O 
The la.w of t:'ature, as Hooker perceives it, does not require a specific 
31 form of government. Yet once a political authority hae been established, 
its power is perpetual; that is to say, the laws of the past are binding on 
the present. 
Wherefore as an:r man t s deed past is good as long as himself 
eontinueth; so the act or a public society of men done five 
hundred years sithence standeth as theira who present~ are 
of the same societies, because corporations are immortal; 
we ware then alive in our3~redecessors, and they in their successors do live still. 
The laws enacted by the government are of two main types. What Hooker clas-
sifies as "mixed law" is legislation concerned with matters dictated by the 
law of P.~ason. It bmds in man's society what bas already been ·.bound by 
his conscience. The other type is "human law" which deals with any matter 
that reason teaches to be proper and convenient, but which involves no trams-
gression of the Law of Reason if violated.. The inheritance and distribution 
. 33 
of land is an example of a problem governed by human law. 
Upon first analysis, the preceding summaries of some of the fundamental 
ideas of Hooker and locke may appear similar. Several concepts including 
the State of Nature, Natural law, reason, the establishment of political 
authority by consent, and the nature of God are discussed by both authors. 
The differences are more subtle than apparent, yet it is only through a 
close examination and understanding of the distinctive elements in each that . 
a valid interpretation of the relationship between the two men can be made. 
12 
The freedom of man in the State of Nature is an important axiom of 
locke's theory· of Natural taw, also acknowlede:ed by Hooker. Hooker v~ewa 
this natural equality and freedom of man as both a moral and political prin-
ciple which contributes to a foundation of mutual love, justice, and charity 
34 
in the image of C~. By this assertion he refuses to support the Aristo-
telian doctrine that the origin of political authority is to be discovered 
35 
in man's natural inequality. The significant disparity between Hooker and 
Locke in regard to their impression of the State of Nature arises out or the 
fo~er's complete failure to recognize the existence of the natural rights 
of individuals prior to and independent of the establishment or the civil 
state. This concept, as has been demonstrated, is actually the key to an 
understanding of Locke 1 s entire political theory. 
For Hooker it is possible to conceive of mankind living apirt from so-
ciety. It is the natural inclination of men~ toward social life, hol-:ever, 
which is the primary, positive cause for the creation of government. Locke 
presents a much narrO'\-rer definition of civil society. i'Thile admitting so-
ciability, he maintains that this fundamental desire can be satisfied in 
the family or tribal unit.36 No substantial differentiation betl"feen the 
37 
State of Nature and the State of Society is implied by Locke, and he there-
by restricts the origin of political society to the compact among individuals 
for the express purpose of preserving property. 
The executive power of Natural Law 1orithing the State of Nature is another 
idea dissimilarly interpreted by Hooker and Locke.38 In the first Book of 
Ecclesiastical Polit:v, Hooker expresses his belief that God alone possesses 
· the authority to judge and exact punishment tor transgressions against the 
Law of Nature. 
Rewards and punishments are· not received, but at the hands of 
such as being above us have power to examine and judge oar 
deeds ••• from Hfmwho diseerneth and judgeth the very secrets 
of all hearts: therefore He is the only rewarder and reveng-
er of all such actions; although not of such actions only, 
but of all whereby the Law of Nature is broken whereof Himself 
is author.39 . 
This aff:irina.tion is clearly the antithesis of Locke's "Strange Doctrine" 
that each individtJal in his natural state has the right to punish viola-
tions of Natural Law. Once again, the absence in Hooker and emphasis by 
"Locke of the concept of natural rights is evident and consequential. 
13 
The doctrine of government by consent of the governed is probably the 
one political theory developed by Locke which has most frequently and jus-
tifiably been attributed to Hooker's earlier work. In EcclesiastiealJ:ill-
!!z Hooker clear13' states without qualification that "laws they are not there-
fore.,which public approbation hath not me.de so.••40 At the same time, the 
underlying variance of meaning inferred from the two philosophers must be 
acknowledged. nconsent" rilay broadly be defined as the act of fl"Snting per-
mission to some agent to do something which it would otherwise have no 
right to do. The question involved in the application of this definition 
to political thought concerns the source of this right which is thus granted. 
The contractual theory of the origin of civil society as Locke pr~ 
tesses it pertains to the resignation b7 every individual to society of his 
natural power to exercise the Law of Nature and to protect his property. 
h Consent is equated with the trasfe~ of individual powers and expresses the 
42 
conviction that no man can be compelled to do that which be does not assent. 
Although he insists there is no political authority without public approval, 
Hooker does not actually formalize a contract theory of governmenb. To him 
consent is an expression of the reality that power belongs naturally to 
---------
society, not to individuals. There is not only a natural impulse to enter 
into fellowship, but also a moral obligation under the Law of Nature to do 
so. As Dr. George Bull interprets Hooker, "consent actuates a moral obli-
gation from the Natural Law, to live in a society whose prerogatives, rights 
43 
and duties come not from individuals but from that same Law or Nature." 
Professor Alexander P. D'Entreves achieves a basis tor comparison of 
the doctrine of' consent by the governed by employing a definition of two 
forms of a contractual arrangement. The agreement among peoples with a 
sovereign power to obey its authority, or pe,etum sub,lectionis, is distin-
guished from the agreement among all men to unite, a pactum societatis or 
unionis. The former idea, suggested by Hooker, describes a contract between 
men for the common purpose of establishing, accept,ing, and yielding to some 
kind of government. The emphasis is placed on the community as a living 
organism which exhibits historical growth. In this sense, Hooker approaches 
the problem of consent from the standpoint or constitutional facts and demo-
cratic premises grounded in history and experience, not as an abstract prin-
ciple. The second type of contract is derived from the vitally important 
doctrine of the natural rights of the individual human personality. This 
concept, is not generally associated with political theory until the Seven-
teenth and Eighteenth Centuries and is certainly total.ly absent from Hooker's 
work. It best describes the individualistic rather than organic structure 
44 
of society envisioned b.Y Locke. 
Meaningful comprehension of the contractual theory of government is de-
pendent upon recognition of the problems of past versus present, individu-
alistic versus organic, initiative versus operative, and tacit versus genuine 
manifestations of consent. Hooker's statement that "corporationsc·are immortal" 
15 
and its corollary that laws of the past bind future generations raise the 
question of whether societies should be regarded as separate entities, or 
whether Bn7 corporate personality affixed to society is fictitious, and only 
45 individuals are real. Implied by Hooker's premise ::i.s the idea that the 
solidarity of a political community is the product of its history, traditions, 
and institutions, and that the people t s consent is founded upon past commit-
menta. 
The distinction in Locke • s writing between individual assent and the 
vague approval of the public is often confusing. He formulates an individu-
alistic concept of the inauguration of a state by his doctrine of the willful 
agreement to leave the State of Nature and relinquish the natural right of 
punishment to an executive power. In grappling with the actual operation of 
government, however, Locke tends to substitute the idea of trust for consent. 
Government by consent remains an historical and constitutional reality not 
by means of personal contracts, but betiauae the civil authority is sensitive 
to public opinion and fulfills the trust to govern by known, not arbitrary 
46 laws for the public good. The role of the individual in the ongoing or 
the political community is explained by !Dcke in terms of citizenship. Upon 
reaching the age of reason, a child adopts adult status as a citizen and in 
so doing, consents to obey goverment and be bound by the decision of the ma-
jority. 
!J:>cke and Hooker both agree that political power bas its source in the 
governed, that governmental authority must be subject to law, and that the 
law of the land must be in accordru~ce with the higher laws of Reason and Na-
ture. What then are their respective interpretations of the +imitations of 
-
political obligation? Hooker's premise is that consent creates the authority 
16 
to command obedience. He maintains .that the onlY justification for disobe-
dience to civil law is demonstrable evidence that the legislation is contrary 
to the Iaw of God and o! Reason.. If society refuses to recognize power over 
it, then that authority does not exist at a11. 47 Supremacy of law and order 
seem to be Hooker's main concern• In Book VIII he states t~~t there is 1~ith-
out order;. no living in public society, because the want thereof is the moth-
48 
er o.f confusion. 11 It naturally .follows that duties and not rights are 
stressed by Hooker. 
U>cke also realizes that government is not an artificial device to be 
overthrown at pleasure and possesses the right to expect obedience. He 
emphasizes, however, the end whereto government was established, nrunely the 
guarantee of freedom through the protection or citizen. s property. Govern-
t.ent, to Locke, hac no authority beyond its object of preserving the natu-
ral rights of property; it is entrusted Hith a responsibility and becomes 
liable \'¥hen this trust is abused. Hooker insists that government takes away 
the prerogative o.f refusing obedience to a law unless it is immoral. Impli-
cit in these statements by Hooker and Locke are two antagonistic vi~dpoints 
of the idea of sovereignty~ To Locke's 'my of thinking, revolution is an 
inalienable right based not only upon the contractual theory but also upon 
the belief that God t s law is supreme over unjust human statutes. It is im-
possible for the conmn.1nity to surrender all its po-.t~ers. Ultimate sovereign-
ty to dissolve the government nnd create a new authority resides with the 
people. Hooker barely, if ever, refers to a right of resistance. Instead, 
he makes the power invested in the king or other executive authority irrev-
49 
ocable and provides no recourve in the event or tyranny, but to God. 
The underlying disparity in the implications of the political theories 
17 
presented by Hooker and Locke, causes one to seek a firmer basis for compar-
ison and a valid explanation for irreconcilable presuppositions. A primary 
means of' evaluating Hook:er 1 s ~ ~ Ecclesiastical Politz and Lockers ~ 
Treatises ,gn Civil Government is to identify each by its purpose within a 
particular historical context. 
Richard Hooker wrote the eight books or his major work in England during 
the last decade or the reign of Queen Elizabeth I •. The English Reformation 
had been brought about earlier through fundamental legal and constitutional 
changes enacted in ra.yal interests and occurred before any doctrinal trans-
formation took place. By the end of the Sixteenth Century, English society 
was caught up in religious controversy, and the Elizabethan Settlement or 1559, 
was str~ly being attacked ~the Puritans. 11The Puritan challenge to the 
Church of F,ngland was primarily and essentially the challenge of a narrow 
and intolerant scripturalism to every 1nunan authority and to all historical 
50 development." The foundation of the position of the Puritan controversial-
ists was the central tenets of the primacy of will over reason and the com-
plete dependence of man on scriptural authority. Calvin and his followers 
contended that religion transcended the intellect and that every person through 
private revelation received authority to serve as the mouthpiece or divine : : 
law. Human laws were admitted, at best, to be derived from Natural Law but 
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were considered potentially invalid and pernicious. By insistinl" upon 
reyelation only through S~ripture, the Puritans denied the vs.lidity of the 
Law or Reason and emphasized the impotence of man for achieving good. 
As an AnSt:lican clergyman, Hooker • s theological task was to prove that 
man's spiritual growth in the image of God was dependent upon a broader base 
than Scripture, namely on obedience through reason to Natural Law which is a 
18 
reflection of the Eternal Law and an instrument instituted by the Divine 
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for the guidance of Hie creation. In Book II of Ecclesiastical Polity, 
Hooker considers the Puritan appeal to Scripture as the rule or all things. 
He refers to the Old Testament passage in Proverbs 2:9, which says that 
"Wisdom doth teach men every good way. u53 This wisdom amanates from God, 
and humanity must allow for varied manifestations or its teaching. The 
Infinite can not be conf'ined, nor is its revelation found only in the Scrip-
tures but also in nature and worldly exper!ence. Hooker does not attack the 
genuineness of the Bible itself, but the erroneous manipulation of its con-
tents. He would never deny the doctrine that the Word of God is a true 
source of knowledge, but he insists that the Scriptures are neither self~ 
illuminative nor self-authenticating. The credence required by Scripture 
54 
is not ereated therein. One is justified in concluding that knowledge or 
salvation is revealed through Scripture, but not that all truths are expli-
t?itly contained in the Scriptures, nor that of what is found all can be in-
terpreted as law. The written Word of the Bible presupposes that man has 
been given the tool of reason to interpret Scripture and tradition provided 
by God. Hooker thus emerges as a Christian humanist. The biblical radical-
ism of his opponents is shown to be not only anti-intellectual and inconsist-
ent, but a aebasement or God and man. The Puritans are condemed for making 
God an arbitrary slave or His Word, and for insisting on the depravity and 
intellectual helpl~gsness of man.55 
The theme of the last Book of Ecclesiastical Polity is that in a Chris-
tian community, Church and State cannot be conceived of as separate and op-
posed societies, but as coincident, with the Crown supreme and ecclesiasti-
56 
cal law ultimately the same as civil law. The Church is defined in Book 
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Ill as both visible and invisible. The mystical, universal Church alone 
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is the true Church, founded upon interior faith. Its members are known only 
to God. The external manifestation, or visible Church, is concerned with 
duties toward God and is recognized by the three prerequisites or one Icrd, 
one faith, one baptism.58 Hooker seeks to ahad that the political eo~1nity 
and the visible Church actually have the same origin. They work toward simi-
lar ends, for the Ste.te is responsible for both moral and material functions. 
The relationship betueen the civil and ecclesiastical communities are linked 
by Hooker in his analogy of a triangle. 
\>le hold, that seeing there is not any rn1n of the Church or Eng-
land but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor 
any man a member of the commomfealth, which is not also of the 
Church of England; therefore as in a figure triangular the base 
doth differ from the sides thereof, gijd yet one and the self'sam~ 
line is both a base and also a side. 
The political philosophy of Hooker is an integral part of his defense of 
the Erastian relationship of the Church of England and the Tudor monarchy. 
He was commissioned to supply the reasonable foundation for the existing es-
tablishment. Hooker writes from the standpoint or a conservative impelled 
by the exigency of the time to justify the stntus quo. In order to prove 
that the Puritan contensions were inconsistent with the political structure 
of England~ he was obliged to examine the nature or the State and the sources 
of authority. He hoped to show that criticism or the Anglican Church and 
refusal to conform to the Elizabethan Settlement could not be rationalzy 
60 justified. He had concluded in Book III that the Scripture:s do not require 
a particular form of church polity, and thus, demonstrated that the Church of 
England was not contrary to either the Word of God or to reason. 61 His doc-
trine that resistance to authority can be vindicated only in the case of im-
moral law condemns the Puritan position as a denial of the .fundamental nature 
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of political obedience. 
The motivation for Hooker's conservative political theories1 and indeed 
for the philosophical and theological work as a whole, was an intrinsic fear 
that.a general acceptance of the doctrine of private revelation'would lead 
to spiritual chaos and civll confusion. Hooker distrusted the extreme indi-
vidualism of Puritanism, alarmed by the possibility that it . might replace the 
corporate spirit of the English State. For the all-embracin~ cause of public 
order, Hooker was willing to submit private interpretation to public reason 
determined by the law of the legislature. He believed· that a rational deci-
~~ 
sion of Parliament cr. the Convocation was more likely to be in accordance 
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with the wi}.l or God than .the inspiration of a saintly individual. 
The significance of Richard Hooker is that he elevated the controvers.y 
or church -polity beyond the biekerings of his time to a higher, philosophical 
plane. Unlike earlier apologists for Anglicanism, Hooker did not undertake 
a counterattack solely on the Puritan ground of scriptural authority, but 
operated from a detached, independent standpoint employing the weapon of rea-
63 . 
son. He became the first systematic theologian of the English Church, and 
it is to this accomplishment that his greatness is attributed. 
Writing almost a century later, John Ulcke was influenced indirectly and 
directly by major developnents unknown to Hooker. The Seventeenth Century 
witnessed the convergence of three revolutionary movements. In religion, 
the critical genius of the Reformation ~e to full self-consciousness as a 
spirit of rationalism, individual judgment, and liberty or inquiry invaded 
all aspects or society. The birth of modern science was a sif,Dificant out-
growth of the Copernican revolution. The heliocentric theory of the universe 
proposed by Copernieus removed man from his previously undisputed position 
21 
of central importanc8 in the world order.. A uniformity of nature was sub-
stituted for the medieval system of a hierarchy under the heavens. Finally., 
the application of Descartes's mathematical interpretation of the universe 
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unloosed a revolution in the philosophy or knowledge. 
locke stood in the main currents of the scientific thought and discovery 
of his century. He was a contemporary of Isaac Newton, whose coherent theory 
of the physical universe presented in 1687, in his Mathematical Principles 
~ Natural Philosopqy, provided the first modern scientific synthesis and 
greatly increased man 1 s faith in the powers of human reason. The idea of 
applying new experimental methods in the natural sciences to the problems 
or human disease, drew IA:>cke to the study of medicine. He devoted much time 
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to medical research, although he never became a professional physician. 
Perhaps the most sienificant influence on Locke 1 s basic thought process was 
Robert Boyle, one of the founders of the Royal Society in England. Boyle 
was an adherent of the "new philosophy" that stressed observation and the 
application of mathematics to the study of natural phenomena. The central 
thesis or Locke's environmental philosophy in the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding,.·. that no ideas are innately known to the human mind but are 
I 
derived from experience, was foreshadowed in Boyle's acknowledgment of the 
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limited extent of certain human knowledge. 
In moral philosophy and theology, two contemporary liberal movements 
in England are certain to have influenced Locke greatly. One was Cambridge 
Platonism, the term 'applied to the thought which emerged from a school or 
erudite theologians which flourished in Cambridge. in the mid-Century. The 
Platonists criticized the materialism of Thomas Hobbes as well as the dog-
mat ism of Protestant enthusiast8. Their basic outlook was rational, for 
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for they believed that reason could be wholly trusted within its own sphere 
of operation without coming into conflict with revelation. Reason was in-
fallible and enabled man to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Each 
individual was believed to be a free agent with sufficient reason to order 
h1s own life. This confl.dence in mari 1s mind made them brOad-minded and tol-
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erant. 
The second movement which helped foster a liberal spirit in Locke was 
Latitudinarianism. Theologians and ecclesiastics of the Anglican Church, 
the latitudinarians wished to establish so wide a foundation for the Church 
that all believers in Christ could be accommodated in it. They distinguish-
. ed between the very few essentials of the Christian faith, such as the af-
firmation that Christ is the Son of God, from the innumerable non-essentials. 
Because disagreement over non-essentials causes separation among men, con-
68 
formity to them should not be demanded. 
The ideas of the Cambridge Platonists and the latitudinarians are re-
flected in Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration which seeks to deal with 
the problem of the relationship between government and the individual con-
science. He argues that the care of the soul is beyond the jurisdiction 
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of the magistrate because true religion is an inward matter. The end of 
civil laws is not conformity of religious opinion, but preservation of the 
commonwealth. Locke maintains that toleration of individuals is the mark 
ot a true Church 70 and concludes his Letter with a "Golden Rule" or reli-
gious toleration. 
This only I say--that however clearly we may think this or 
the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not 
therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article or 
faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of 
faith, unless we would be content also that othJ?1 doctrines 
should be imposed upan us in the same manner ••• 
The traditional textbook explanation for the origin of Locke's Two 
-
Treatises ,2! Civil Government is that he wrote this political document in 
1690, primarily to justify the Glorious Revolution of 168S, which estab-
lished William III on the English throne. The recent scholarship of Peter 
!aslett disclaims this assumption. He presents the thesis that the Treatises 
were written earlier, the product of an already perfected political theory 
of the nature of society, property, natural rights, and the ethical dictates 
upon government. Locke's work turned out "to be a demand for a revolution 
to be brought about, not the rationalization or a revolution in need of 
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defence." Whatever the immediate eauso1 the result and fundamental im-
portance of Locke's Treatises 't1'as the reconciliation of the relationship 
of man in the universe of the Seventeenth Century to political society, in 
particular to the constitutional monarchy in England. 
Even more important than identifying historical influences, an aware-
ness of the essential differences in philosophical outlook is necessary if 
the works of Hooker and Locke are to be understood and validly related. 
These distinctions are demonstrated most clearly in the two approaches to 
the concept of Natural Law. Hooker can be called the last great represent-
ative of the medieval school or Natural Law which was theologically con-
ditioned and identified ltrith the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The eternal 
mind of God is presupposed as the ultimate source or law in an ordered, hier-
archical universe where the natural and supernatural exist in harmonious 
relationship. The content of Natural law is determined by the particular 
view of human nature. To the medieval niind, man was created in the image 
of God and endowed with the divine impulse to seek collli'Wnion with and know-
ledge of God. ~an's natural propensities were divine propensities which 
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73 God allowed man to exercise on his behalf •" The gulf between God's infin-
ity and man's humanity is bridged by reason. Professor D'Entreves provides 
the best description of the idea of Natural La~ in the Thomistic tradition. 
~ •• a bridge thrown, as it were, across the gulf which divides 
man from his divine Creator. In natural law is expressed the 
dignity and power of man, and thus of his reason which allows 
him, alone of created beings, to participate intell,~tually 
a.nd actively in the rational order of the universe. 
!Dcke belongs to a new chapter in the history of the natural law theory 
characterterized in the Seventeenth Century by rationalism and empiricism. 
There is a narrowing of the field over which reason rules supreme. The uni-
verse could be understood rationally, but must be compared with the observed 
facts about human behavior and physical phenomena.75 The law ot Nature is 
no longer conceived of as a set of concrete rules which could be determined 
and practically applied) but a moral system to which all men should conform. 
This interpretation correlates close~ with Locke's theory of knowledge, 
that while no ideas are innately known, moral truths are certain and capable 
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ot demonstration. The vast universe, a "Great Machine" created by the 
power and wisdom of God, is an impenetrable mystery tor locke. Man exists 
within this universe, endowed with a "little candle of reason" which enables 
him to discover something of the Law of Nature under which he must live. 
The possibility of determining details ot conduct is precluded by human 
finiteness, but I.Dcke believes general principles of existence are discover-
77 
able. 
Hooker must generally be classified as a medievalist; his approach is 
basically theological. Working with epistemological apparatus such as reason 
and revelatio~ he assumes the existence of God in an ordered universe. His 
thinking is deductive, beginning with God s.nd a system of laws he created, 
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and concluding with specific justifications of a relationship of Church and 
State and various religious practices. locke, on the other hand, employs an 
inductive process that begins by looking at man where he is or where he 
would be were the indifferent externals of society removed. From a theory 
of the natural state of man, Locke builds his concept or natural rights and 
the pur-pose and function or government. The existence of God and natural 
law, so overwhelmingly essential to Hooker's thinking, are not denied by 
Locke, but neither are they exphasized or analyzed. The basis or locke's 
theoretical thought process is empirical rather than epistemological. He 
does not assume a philosophical rationale, but derives his ideas from em-
pirieal observation or man's basic nature. 
What then can be said in conclusion of the relationship between Hooker 
and Locke? Locke was probably sincere in his integration or Hooker's words 
into the Second Treatise, but he was also undoubtably aware that such ref-
erence to the Anglican defender would greatly benefit the reception of his 
political ideas by his Tory opponents. At the close of his work, Locke 
himself admits that 
I could send ~ Reader to Eraeton, Fortescue, and the Author 
of the Mirrour, and others; Writers, who cannot be suspected 
to be ignorant of our Government, or Enemies to it. But I 
thought Hooker alone might be enough to satisfie those Men, 
who relying on him for their Ecclesiastical Polity, are by 
!ftrange fa~g carried to deny those principles upon which he 
builds it. 
The thesis of Dr. Bull is that all items borrowed from Hooker by Locke were 
transformed to meet the philosopher's needs. The result is that Hooker is 
ultimately made to sponsor an idea diametrically opposed to his own purpose 
'"8 
of definding the English crown as the supreme seat or all civil authority. 
Without totally accepting the severity or this judgment, it remains valid 
26 
to conclude that the resemblance between the political theories of Locke 
. and Hooker is more nominal than real. Doctrines shared in common, such as 
the credence given to the concepts of reason, Natural law, and the consent 
of the governed. are outweighed by the more fundamental differences in in-
terpretation brought to light by an understanding of the purpose, histori-
cal influences, and philosophical perspective which dintinguish the two men. 
The significance of the 11sane, noble, sincere, supremely civilized" 
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theologian of the Anglican Church and of the 11first modern philosopher of 
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science" will endure as a result of the peculiar contributions of each to 
the development of thought within his own historical context, and not be-
cause of their relationship to each other. Richard Hooker may have failed 
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to pose all the fundamental questions necessary for a complete philosoph;y,·· 
but by relating his political ideas to a universal world order he gave ex-
pression to the subject of man 1s human experience in general and became an 
indispensable source for understanding English History of the Sixteenth 
Century. John Locke did not claim to be a comprehensive metaphysician, for 
he set forth philosophical questions realizing the limits of human under-
standing. His' association with the modern, liberal mind rests upon his 
separation of philosoph;y from theology and its assignment to the proper 
realm of man's experience. Within the development of the Seventeenth 
Century, Loeke 1s greatness lies in his achievement of a new scientific 
view of the relationship of man to an infinite universe. 
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